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Abstract: Overconfidence is one of the most robust behavioral anomalies in financial markets.
By attributing investment gains to their ability, investors become overconfident and trade aggressively
in subsequent periods. Evidence from stock markets shows that overconfidence leads to excessive
trading and, subsequently, inferior investment performance. However, studies on overconfidence
effect are lacking in the real estate sector, which is particularly true for Asia Pacific real estate
investment trust (REIT) markets. Thus, this study examines the overconfidence effect in six Asia
Pacific REIT markets, namely, Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan.
The study finds that the overconfidence effect is more conspicuous during market boom periods or
in inefficient market conditions. In addition, simulation analysis demonstrates that overconfidence
could lead to rather large volumes of excessive trading activities in certain markets. Findings are
robust across the alternative measures of control variables. Moreover, the policy implications of the
research are also discussed.
Keywords: judgmental bias; behavioral finance; investment decision; real estate
JEL Classification: G12; G15; G41
1. Introduction
Economists have long found it difficult to justify investors’ enthusiasm for active trading in
financial markets. Rational investors trade when liquidity demand emerges and when they need
risk hedging or portfolio rebalancing. However, evidence affirms that investors regularly trade too
frequently, especially in bull markets (Griffin et al. 2007; Odean 1999; Shiller 1981, 1983). Such active
trading behavior is significantly related to poor subsequent investment performance (Barber et al. 2009;
Barber and Odean 2000, 2001; Kuo and Lin 2013). Among many factors, overconfidence is the simple
and powerful explanation for the excessive trading activity (Barber and Odean 2001; Odean 1998).
Overconfidence is one of the most persistent and significant phenomena in the psychology
of judgment (De Bondt and Thaler 1985). More than half of investors consider their investment
skills better than the average level (Glaser and Weber 2007; Statman et al. 2006). In addition,
people exhibit considerable precision regarding their own information but have less precision toward
public information (Daniel et al. 1998; Odean 1998). Over the past decades, this topic has attracted
growing interest from academia and the industry, particularly in the financial sector. Evidence
validates that overconfidence has significant implications on investment decisions, such as saving
behaviors and motives (Sakalaki et al. 2005), retirement planning (Parker et al. 2012), stock trading
frequency (Glaser and Weber 2007; Statman et al. 2006), and stock market participation (Xia et al. 2014).
Most importantly, overconfidence negatively affects investment performance (Daniel et al. 1998;
Hanauer 2014; Janus et al. 2013).
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Although research on overconfidence improves our understanding of investor behaviors, current
studies mainly focus on stock markets. The real estate market has not received sufficient attention in this
stream of research. A healthy real estate market is vital for the macroeconomy of the state in the long
run (Bates et al. 2015). However, the uniqueness of the asset class also subjects investors to behavioral
biases. For instance, evidence verifies that real estate prices are affected by the confidence level of
investors (Zheng et al. 2016). Homeowners tend to systematically overestimate their home value
during market downturns (Chan et al. 2016). One may suspect that overconfidence also affects investor
behaviors in the real estate market. Yet this interesting hypothesis remains untested. This paper aims
to bridge this gap.
The study focuses on Asia Pacific real estate investment trust (REIT) markets. The recent decade
witnessed a rapid growth of the Asia Pacific REIT market in terms of the number of REITs and market
capitalization. In 2016, the Asia Pacific region had 268 REITs, 63 of which are included in the EPRA
REIT index. The two figures are larger than those in Europe, which have 139 REITs in total, and 59
of them are included in the EPRA REIT index. In 2018, listed real estate companies and REITs in
the Asia Pacific region constitute 34.23% of the FTSE/EPRA/NAREIT Global Index, which is higher
than the percentage of those in Europe (i.e., 16.61%)1. By 2020, the total number of listed real estate
companies and REITs included in the EPRA REIT index is 180 and 109 for the Asia Pacific region and
Europe, respectively. The annualized return between 2016 and 2020 is 5.9% for the EPRA NAREIT
Asia Pacific Index and only 1.7% per year for the EPRA NAREIT Europe Index. These numbers signify
a remarkable growth and development potential in the future for the Asia Pacific region. We suspect
that overconfidence plays a significant role in these fast-growing markets, and consequently set up this
research to verify this hypothesis.
Moreover, most Asia Pacific REIT markets are not as efficient as those in developed REIT markets,
such as the US. Despite the rapid development and the increasing attention to investment in the
recent decade, Asian REIT markets are relatively immature. For instance, South Korea and Taiwan
markets have short sale restrictions, and several markets have a low transparency level. Discrepancies
also exist regarding political risk, legal system, corruption level, and disclosure degree in the Asia
Pacific real estate markets (Cashman et al. 2014, 2016). Evidence from stock markets corroborates that
inefficient markets (e.g., markets with a low transparency level or short sale constraints) are prone
to overconfident trading (Chuang et al. 2014; Griffin et al. 2007). Furthermore, existing studies that
investors in the US REIT market exhibit an overconfident trading behavior, which is similar to stock
traders (Lin et al. 2010). If this effect remains true for Asia Pacific REITs, a strong overconfidence effect
is expected. Therefore, testing the overconfidence hypothesis in the fast-growing Asia Pacific REIT
markets is important.
The study evaluates one of the most robust findings about the effect of overconfidence, that is,
the increase of trading volume (Odean 1998). Evidence from stock markets confirms that overconfidence
and trading activity are positively associated (Chuang and Lee 2006; Statman et al. 2006). Trading
activity is connected to previous market returns through overconfidence. Specifically, overconfident
investors mistakenly interpret previous market gains as their superior ability to select stocks and,
consequently, trade more frequently in the future (Gervais and Odean 2001). Do real estate investors
also exhibit overconfident trading behavior? Specifically, in the aggregate level, do previous gain
results in a significant increase in trading volume? This is the first research question to be answered in
this paper.
Subsequently, the relation between market features and overconfident trading is considered.
If overconfidence affects investor behaviors in the Asia Pacific REIT markets, does the effect vary
according to market settings? Every REIT market in the Asia Pacific region is unique in terms
of regulation, structure, openness, and development direction, providing the study a significant
1 Source: EPRA/NAREIT Global and Global ex US indices Factsheet. (www.ftse.com/products/indices/epra-nareit.html).
J. Risk Financial Manag. 2020, 13, 232 3 of 21
opportunity to compare the overconfidence effects in different market settings. This question is
particularly relevant to policymakers and regulators in the Asia Pacific region. The answers to this
question could assist the design of policies and regulations to vigorously protect investors from
irrational investment behaviors (e.g., overconfident trading).
Finally, if overconfidence and trading volume are related, then does the relationship vary with
time? Specifically, investors in up- and down-markets may behave differently under the influence
of overconfidence. In stock markets, the overconfidence effect on trading is profoundly conspicuous
in bull markets (Chuang and Lee 2006). As REITs behave similarly to stocks (Glascock et al. 2000;
Nneji et al. 2013; Yang et al. 2012), the asymmetric overconfidence effects may also exist in REIT
markets. This is the third research question to be answered in this study.
The empirical implementation involves data from six Asia Pacific REIT markets (i.e., Japan,
Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) from 1994 to 2015. The vector
autoregression (VAR) model is used to explore the return–turnover dynamics and impulse response
functions to trace the influence of previous return shocks on market turnover. A significant and positive
overconfidence effect is identified regarding the market turnover in South Korea, Taiwan, Japan,
and Singapore REIT markets. The effect is particularly strong in less efficient markets with short sale
restrictions and low market transparency (i.e., in South Korea and Taiwan). With the re-estimation of
the VAR model with up- and down-market sub-samples separately, we found a stronger overconfidence
effect in the up-market for Japan, Singapore, and South Korea REIT markets.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical framework and
testable hypotheses. Section 3 introduces data and empirical methods. Section 4 provides the empirical
results and discussions, and Section 5 indicates the robustness checks. Finally, Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2. Theoretical Framework and Testable Hypotheses
Odean (1998) conducted the first systematic analysis of overconfidence and its influence on the
stock market. By adding an overprecision condition to the rational microstructure framework of
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Kyle (1985), Odean (1998) derived a new market equilibrium under
overconfidence. Building upon the work of Odean (1998), Gervais and Odean (2001) developed
a self-learning model that describes how investors become overconfident by learning from their
investment performance. Specifically, investors attribute their past success to their own ability to select
stocks, which boosts their confidence and subsequently leads to excessive trading volume in the future.
These studies offer a behavioral explanation to excessive trading volume, a long-standing anomaly in
the stock market.
Following these theoretical studies, a body of literature has empirically examined the
overconfidence effect on generating trading volume. For instance, Statman et al. (2006) identified a
significant lead-lag relationship between turnover and return in the US stock market. On aggregate,
market-wide trading activity increases following previous market gains as a consequence of
overconfident trading behavior. Therefore, the first testable hypothesis is developed as follows:
Hypothesis 1. On the market level, the current trading activity of REITs is positively related to past market return.
Specifically, the relationship between trading activity and market return can be represented by
Equation (1) below, without losing any generality.
TURNt = f (RETt−1) (1)
where TURNt is the market turnover of REITs in period t and RETt−1 is the market return of REITs in
period t − 1. If Hypothesis 1 is true, then d f (RETt−1)dRETt−1 > 0.
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After the lead-lag relationship between turnover and return has been established in the literature,
researchers explored the dynamics of this relationship in different market conditions. Using data from
the stock markets of 46 countries, Griffin et al. (2007) proved that the lead-lag relationship between
return and turnover is particularly strong in countries with opaque, volatile, and inefficient financial
markets. Similar findings are also found in Asian stock markets, where the relationship is more
pronounced in markets with short sale restrictions (Chuang et al. 2014). Short selling restrictions in
the real estate sector can create overvaluation and contribute to long bubble periods (Chen et al. 2012;
Ikromov and Yavas 2012). A transparent real estate market is also linked to rational behaviors.
For instance, in a study on real estate mutual funds, the herding behavior is low in transparent real
estate stocks (Ro and Gallimore 2014).
Asia Pacific REIT markets differ in their regulatory requirements, as certain markets have
short sale constraints, and some of them have a relatively low transparency level. Investors in
these emerging economies are more prone to behavioral bias because these economies have more
constraints, strong market governance, and high opaqueness, especially when as regards overconfidence
(Chuang et al. 2014; Griffin et al. 2007). Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is derived as follows:
Hypothesis 2. Inefficient REIT markets (i.e., markets with a low transparency level and short sale constraints)
are more prone to overconfidence.
If Hypothesis 2 is true, we expect that:
d f (RETt−1
∣∣∣ine f f icient market)
dRETt−1
>
d f (RETt−1
∣∣∣e f f icient market)
dRETt−1
Another moderator of the overconfidence effect is market condition. As people tend to be more
confident when gaining profit, it is reasonable to assume that overconfidence effect is prominent in bull
markets. Both theoretical and empirical overconfidence literature supports such a claim. For instance,
Chuang and Lee (2006) found that the increase of turnover to return is asymmetric in bull and bear
markets, with a more prevalent response in bull markets. Thus, the study aims to determine how the
return–turnover relationship changes with the market conditions of REITs. Thus, the third testable
hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 3. The overconfidence effect is more significant in up-market conditions than in down-market ones.
If Hypothesis 3 is true, then we expect that:
d f (RETt−1
∣∣∣up market)
dRETt−1
>
d f (RETt−1|down market)
dRETt−1
3. Data and Models
Data were collected from six Asia Pacific REIT markets, namely, Singapore, Japan, South Korea,
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Australia. The sampling period of each market is from the earliest available
time in Datastream (see the second column in Table 1) to March 2015. Figure 1 shows the total number
of REITs and the market capitalization of the six Asia Pacific markets combined from 2001 to 2015.
Given that the REIT market of Australia has a longer history than that of the other five Asian REIT
markets, a separate market capitalization series is also produced (i.e., the Asia market cap series) for
Asian REIT markets, excluding that of Australia.
The Asia Pacific REIT markets developed rapidly between 2001 and 2007. However, upon the
onset of the global financial crisis in 2007, the market capitalization and the number of REITs plummeted
sharply. The markets have slowly recovered since 2009 and quickly gained momentum again. At the
end of 2014, the Asia Pacific REIT markets exceeded the peak in 2007, reaching a total market
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capitalization of 256 billion USD. The number of REITs also increased from 102 in December 2009 to 164
in December 2014. In comparison, the growth in the Asian REIT markets (i.e., excluding Australia) is
even more impressive. The recovery from the global financial crisis in Asian REIT markets is stronger
than that in Australia. The market capitalization stood at 180 billion USD in early 2015, which is more
than three times of the pre-crisis peak in 2007. In sum, the Asia Pacific REIT markets have been growing
rapidly in recent years. The strong growth trend in Figure 1 suggests an increasingly important role of
the Asia Pacific REIT markets in the global economy.
The original data set of this study contains REIT price, trading volume, and the number of
outstanding shares in daily and monthly frequencies. The following transformations are carried out to
generate the variables used in the final analysis.
J. Risk Financial Manag. 2020, 13, x FOR PEER REVIEW  5  of  21 
markets have been growing rapidly in recent years. The str ng growth trend in Figure 1 suggests an 
increasingly important role of the Asia Pacific REIT markets in the global economy. 
 
Figure 1. Real estate investment trust (REIT) market growth in the Asia Pacific region. 
The original data  set of  this  study  contains REIT price,  trading volume,  and  the number of 
outstanding shares in daily and monthly frequencies. The following transformations are carried out 
to generate the variables used in the final analysis. 
3.1. REIT Returns 
Monthly  REIT  returns  are  calculated  by  taking  the  log  difference  of  REIT  prices  in  two 
consecutive months (Equation (2)). 
𝑟௜,௧ ൌ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ቆ 𝑃௜,௧𝑃௜,௧ିଵቇ  (2) 
where  𝑟௜,௧  is the return of REIT i in month t and  𝑃௜,௧  and  𝑃௜,௧ିଵ  are the price of REIT i in month t and 
month t െ 1, respectively. 
We define market return as the value‐weighted monthly return of all individual REITs in each 
corresponding  market.  The  weight  of  each  REIT  in  a  specific  month  is  the  individual  REIT 
capitalization divided by the overall market capitalization of all REITs in the same market. 
𝑅𝐸𝑇௞,௧ ൌ ∑  𝑃௜,௧ ൈ 𝑆௜,௧ ൈ 𝑟௜,௧
௡௜ୀଵ
∑ 𝑃௜,௧ ൈ 𝑆௜,௧௡௜ୀଵ   (3) 
where  𝑅𝐸𝑇௞,௧  is  the market  return  for market k  in month  t and  𝑆௜,௧  is  the number of outstanding 
shares of REIT i in month t within market k. 
3.2. Trading Turnover 
Although monthly  trading volume  is a natural  indicator of  trading activity,  it usually varies 
according to the number of outstanding shares. To remove this confounding factor, the study follows 
the method  by Lo  and Wang  (2000),  in which  the  trading  volume  is divided  by  the  number  of 
outstanding shares (Equation (4)). 
𝑇௜,௧ ൌ 𝑉௜,௧𝑆௜,௧  (4) 
where  𝑉௜,௧  is the trading volume of individual REIT i in month t. 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Nu
mb
er 
of 
RE
IT
s
Ma
rke
t c
ap
: b
illi
on
 US
D
Asia Pacific market cap
Asia market cap
Number of REITs
Figure 1. Real estate investment trust (REIT) market growth in the Asia Pacific region.
3.1. REIT Returns
Monthly REIT returns are calculated by taking the log difference of REIT prices in two consecutive
months (Equation (2)).
ri,t = log
(
Pi,t
Pi,t−1
)
(2)
where ri,t is the return of REIT i in month t and Pi,t and Pi,t−1 are the price of REIT i in month t and
month t − 1, respectively.
We define market return as the value-weighted monthly return of all individual REITs in each
corresponding market. The weight of each REIT in a specific month is the individual REIT capitalization
divided by the overall market capitalization of all REITs in the same market.
RETk,t =
∑n
i=1 Pi,t × Si,t × ri,t∑n
i=1 Pi,t × Si,t
(3)
where RETk,t is the market return for market k in month t and Si,t is the number of outstanding shares
of REIT i in month t within market k.
3.2. Trading Turnover
Alt ough monthly trading volu e is a natural indicator of trading activity, it usually varies
according to the number of outstanding shares. To remove this confounding factor, the study follows the
method by Lo and Wang (2000), in which the trading volume is divided by the number of outstanding
shares (Equation (4)).
Ti,t =
Vi,t
Si,t
(4)
J. Risk Financial Manag. 2020, 13, 232 6 of 21
where Vi,t is the trading volume of individual REIT i in month t.
For the calculation of market turnover, the monthly value-weighted turnover rate of all REITs
in a specific market is obtained. As the resultant turnover series is highly skewed, a natural log
transformation is performed (Equation (5)).
TURNk,t = log
(∑n
i=1 Pi,t × Si,t × Ti,t∑n
i=1 Pi,t × Si,t
)
(5)
where TURNk,t is the market turnover for market k in month t. The variable is detrended with the
Hodrick–Prescott (HP) filter (Hodrick and Prescott 1997) by using a smoothing parameter λ = 14, 400,
following the common practice in the literature to address the autocorrelation issue in TURNk,t.
3.3. Market Volatility
Finance literature suggests that trading volume is positively related to volatility because of the
heterogeneous beliefs of investors in the presence of informational events (Karpoff 1987). Evidence
also affirms a positive relationship between volatility and return in the real estate sector (Huang 2013).
Therefore, market volatility had been routinely included in early studies as a control variable to account
for market-wide common information flow (see, e.g., Bessembinder et al. 1996; Chuang and Lee 2006).
The method by Statman et al. (2006) is used in this study to construct the measurement of market
volatility as follows:
VOLk,t =
m∑
d=1
rk,d2 + 2
m∑
d=1
rk,drk,d−1 (6)
where VOLk,t is the market volatility of market k in month t, rk,d is the market capitalization weighted
average return of all REITs in market k in day d, and m is the total number of days in month t. Although
the frequency of this time series is monthly, VOLk,t reflects the volatility of daily returns within a month.
3.4. Market Dispersion
When the monthly returns of REITs in a given market vary significantly among one another,
investors face a high level of idiosyncratic risk (Statman et al. 2006). To hedge this idiosyncratic risk,
investors need to rebalance their portfolios, subsequently generating additional trading activities,
which is another important confounding factor that should be considered. The solution is to include
the cross-sectional standard deviation of REIT returns (i.e., market dispersion) as another control
variable (Bessembinder et al. 1996; Chuang and Lee 2006).
DISPk,t =
√√∑n
i=1
(
ri,t −RETk,t
)2 × Pi,t×Si,t∑n
i=1 Pi,t × Si,t
(7)
where DISPk,t is the market dispersion of market k in month t. This market dispersion measurement
is essentially the cross-sectional standard deviation of REIT monthly returns in a given market.
Specifically, RETk,t is used as the mean, and
Pi,t×Si,t∑n
i=1 Pi,t×Si,t is used as the value weighting in Equation (7).
This approach is consistent with the calculation of market turnover and return.
The abovementioned transformations generate four variables for each REIT market, as summarized
in Table 1. All 24 time series are stationary based on the augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test and
the Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) test. For the sake of brevity these test results are not
reported but are available from the authors upon request.
Table 1 reveals a significant level of heterogeneity among the six REIT markets. First, the market
turnover in South Korea is above 20% per month, which means that more than 20% of its outstanding
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shares are traded every month. The market is more active than the other four markets2. The same level
of heterogeneity in terms of volatility and dispersion is also observed: market volatility varies between
1.40% (South Korea) and 0.09% (Taiwan), and market dispersion ranges between 5.02% (Singapore) and
1.68% (Taiwan). Therefore, the six markets significantly vary among all four measurements, with South
Korea at the most volatile end and Taiwan being the most stable market. The data set offers an ideal
setting to test the effect of overconfidence among different markets.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics in Asia Pacific REIT markets.
Market From
RET Turnover(Raw) TURN VOL DISP
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Singapore July 2002 0.94% 5.76% 4.11% 1.73% 0.00% 33.21% 0.27% 0.54% 5.02% 3.20%
South Korea May 2001 0.89% 10.85% 20.21% 29.86% 0.00% 78.26% 1.40% 2.59% 3.17% 4.14%
Taiwan July 2006 0.53% 3.26% 1.30% 1.32% 0.00% 67.19% 0.09% 0.32% 1.68% 1.17%
Hong Kong December 2005 0.94% 5.67% 5.77% 6.00% 0.00% 34.40% 0.28% 0.52% 3.46% 2.70%
Japan September 2001 0.93% 6.58% 11.78% 8.28% 0.00% 34.93% 0.52% 1.41% 4.10% 2.58%
Australia May 1994 0.62% 6.37% 3.67% 2.14% 0.00% 23.57% 0.36% 0.84% 4.88% 7.99%
Note: This table reports the descriptive statistics of market return (RET), market turnover (Turnover and TURN),
market volatility (VOL), and market dispersion (DISP) for the six REIT markets. TURN is the detrended log turnover.
All data are collected from Datastream, a financial database with over 35 million individual indicators across all
major asset classes across 175 countries.
A VAR model is estimated to capture the dynamic process of endogenous variables (i.e., TURN
and RET) while controlling for other conditions (i.e., VOL and DISP). The coefficients are estimated by
iterated seemingly unrelated regression, which uses three-stage estimation for systems of simultaneous
equations. For each of the six markets considered, the following equation is estimated:(
TURNk,t
RETk,t
)
=
(
αTURN,k
αRET, k
)
+
P∑
p=1
Ak,p
(
TURNk,t−p
RETk,t−p
)
+
L∑
l=0
Bk,l
(
VOLk,t−l
DISPk,t−l
)
+
(
eTURN, k,t
eRET, k,t
)
(8)
where αTURN,k and αRET,k are the intercepts, eTURN, k,t and eRET, k,t are the disturbance terms, Ak,p and
Bk,l are the coefficient matrices, P and L are the maximum lag length for endogenous and exogenous
variables, and k = 1, 2, . . . , 6 for each of the six REIT markets.
4. Empirical Findings and Discussion
We determine the lag order (i.e., the value of P and L) based on the Akaike information criterion
(AIC) and the Schwarz information criterion (SIC). In our final models, P = 1 and L = 1 for all
countries, except for Japan, for which P = 2 and L = 1. We include the contemporary terms of VOL
and DISP in all VAR models as suggested by existing evidence in the literature (see, e.g., Huang 2013;
Statman et al. 2006). Table 2 summarizes the details of VAR estimation results. All models pass the
Chi-squared test at the 1% level, indicating the models fit the data well. The coefficient loadings of the
two control variables are significant with expected signs in most of the markets. For instance, market
volatility (VOL) has a positive and contemporaneous impact on market turnover (TURN) in South
Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong REIT markets. A similar pattern is also detected between market
dispersion (DISP) and market turnover (TURN) in South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan REIT markets.
These findings offer general support to certain alternative explanations of return–turnover relationship
(i.e., heterogeneous beliefs and portfolio rebalancing), which is consistent with existing findings in the
trading volume literature (see, e.g., Karpoff 1987).
2 In comparison, the monthly market turnover in the UK and the US is 7.81% and 13.2% over the same period, respectively.
The two numbers are calculated using the same approach as the 6 sample economies, with raw data downloaded
from Datastream.
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Table 2. Vector autoregression (VAR) model estimation results.
Market South Korea Taiwan Singapore Australia Hong Kong Japan
Sample Period 2001M6–2015M4 2006M8–2015M4 2002M9–2015M4 1994M6–2015M4 2006M1–2015M4 2001M10–2015M4
Dependent Variable TURNt RETt TURNt RETt TURNt RETt TURNt RETt TURNt RETt TURNt RETt
In
de
pe
nd
en
tv
ar
ia
bl
es TURNt−1 0.291 *** –0.029 *** 0.303 *** –0.001 0.096 –0.004 0.244 *** 0.018 0.213 *** 0.022 0.248 *** 0.015
TURNt−2 — — — — — — — — — — 0.161 ** –0.013
RETt−1 1.265 *** -0.00003 3.762 ** 0.231 *** 1.138 ** 0.266 *** –0.232 –0.025 0.089 –0.124 0.883 ** 0.083
RETt−2 — — — — — — — — — — 0.556 * –0.038
VOLt 8.766 *** 0.898 ** 24.391 * –1.826 ** 5.774 –5.809 *** 1.419 –3.742 *** 16.542 *** –6.581 *** 3.251 ** –2.751 ***
VOLt−1 8.118 *** –0.848 *** 9.406 –3.444 *** 9.609 3.212 *** 2.599 0.249 –6.291 1.818 2.851 0.037
DISPt 4.870 *** 0.352 10.798 ** 1.054 *** 1.152 0.542 *** –0.083 0.549 *** 1.764 0.346 4.117 *** 1.070 ***
DISPt−1 –1.318 –0.195 –0.079 –0.317 0.092 –0.065 0.006 0.061 0.327 0.014 –3.086 *** –0.063
Chi-square 128.612 *** 23.986 *** 47.412 *** 35.708 *** 22.661 *** 63.283 *** 23.948 *** 187.767 *** 26.502 *** 48.745 *** 93.895 *** 78.426 ***
R-squared 0.437 0.126 0.313 0.256 0.131 0.295 0.087 0.429 0.193 0.305 0.368 0.328
AIC −0.208 −2.779 −2.509 −3.259 −2.826 −2.815
Note: This table reports the full sample VAR estimation results of Equation (8). * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01.
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We now focus on the TURN equations (i.e., equations with TURN as the dependent variable) to
test our hypotheses. First, we identify significant overconfident trading behavior in four REIT markets,
that is, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Japan. In the TURN equations, the estimated coefficient
for the lagged terms of RET are all positive and significant, after market volatility and dispersion are
controlled, which suggests that previous market gains prompt investors to trade aggressively in the
current month due to overconfidence. We find evidence to support Hypothesis 1 in four out of the six
Asia Pacific markets considered.
To test Hypothesis 2, we first use the 2014 Jones Lang LaSalle (JLL) Global Real Estate Transparency
Index to rank the six markets by the level of transparency (see Table 3). Australia is the most transparent
market, followed by Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. Coincidentally,
South Korea and Taiwan are also the only two markets where short selling is not allowed (Bris et al. 2007).
If Hypothesis 2 is true, then the effect of overconfidence (i.e., the coefficients of RETt−1 in the TURN
equations) should be the largest for South Korea and Taiwan. Our findings offer strong support to this
hypothesis. The estimated RETt−1 coefficient for South Korea (1.265) is larger than that for Singapore
(1.138) and Japan (0.883). In the Taiwan REIT market, the estimated RETt−1 coefficient (3.762) is almost
triple of that in South Korea.
Table 3. Jones Lang LaSalle (JLL) Transparency Index.
Market 2014 Composite Score 2014 Global Ranking Transparency Level
Australia 1.36 3 H
Singapore 1.81 13 T
Hong Kong 1.87 14 T
Japan 2.22 26 T
Taiwan 2.55 29 S
South Korea 2.90 43 S
Note: H denotes highly transparent; T denotes transparent; and S denotes semi-transparent. Transparency scores
are ranked from 1 (most transparent) to 5 (opaque).
We do not identify any overconfidence effect in the REIT markets of Australia and Hong Kong.
This is probably due to the strong presence of institutional investors in these two countries. Behavioral
studies suggest that individual investors are more prone to overconfidence than institutional ones
(Chuang and Susmel 2011). As such, the overconfidence effect should be weak in markets dominated
by institutional investors. The Australian REIT market has the largest market capitalization among
the Asia Pacific REIT markets, and Hong Kong enjoys a well-established international financial
market. Both economies rank very high in terms of market openness, which also significantly
attracts institutional investors.3 Therefore, it is not surprising that Australia and Hong Kong have an
insignificant return–turnover relationship.
To offer further support to Hypotheses 1 and 2, we estimate the impulse response function (IRF)
from our VAR models to trace the effect of residual shock on endogenous variables over time. We use
the generalized IRF by Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998) to estimate the influence of a
one-standard deviation (SD) innovation on endogenous variables over time. Figure 2 depicts the IRF
of each market after a one-SD return innovation with the confidence bands of two standard errors.
3 Both Hong Kong and Australia rank high in the ICC Open Market Index (https://iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2017/01/
ICCs-OPEN-MARKETS-INDEX-3RD-EDITION-2015.pdf).
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South Korea has the strongest overconfident trading in the months following return shocks.
The market has an immediate turnover response in the first month, which falls dramatically in the
next two months. Meanwhile, inverse U-shaped IRFs are identified in Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan
REIT markets, where the second month sees the largest turnover response, indicating that investors
take time to learn from previous trading performance and establish the overconfidence in their ability
gradually. This argument conforms to the self-learning model suggested by Gervais and Odean (2001).
The turnover responses of South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore over the six-month period
following return shocks are 0.55SD, 0.209SD, 0.27SD, and 0.097SD, respectively. Consistent with the
highest significant return–turnover relation in VAR results, South Korea has the highest accumulated
response among other REIT markets, which is in line with our VAR analysis in Table 1 where significant
overconfidence effect is identified in these markets. The turnover response of the REIT markets in
Australia and Hong Kong is not significantly different from 0 over the 10 months following the return
shocks. These findings further support Hypotheses 1 and 2.
We now estimate Equation (8) with two sub-samples to test Hypothesis 3, that is, whether the
overconfident trading behavior is stronger in bull markets. Although the global financial crisis serves
as a natural setting to test this hypothesis, the six REIT markets respond to the event differently.
For instance, recovery (i.e., the cutoff point between the up- and down-markets) started from October
2008 in South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan, whereas it started in March 2009 for Singapore
and Australia. We choose the May 2013 to June 2014 period to be the down-market period for Taiwan
because data in this period are more recent and reliable than those in the June 2007 to October 2008
period, when the Taiwan REIT market was still in its infancy stage. In Figure 3, we plot the daily
value-weighted price indices and the choice of the up- and down-market sub-sample periods in each of
the six markets4. Equation (8) is re-estimated by using the down- and up-market sub-samples, and the
results are provided in Table 4. For each independent variable, we report its coefficient estimates in the
up- and down-markets together to facilitate comparison.
Consistent with the findings in Table 2, we did not identify any overconfidence effect in the REIT
markets of Australia and Hong Kong. The coefficient estimates of RETt−1 are significant and positive
in the up-market period in South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Japan REIT markets but insignificant
in the down-market period for all countries. Therefore, the findings from the sub-period analysis
provide support to Hypothesis 3. The sub-sample analysis reveals that the overconfidence effect on
trading volume only exists in the up-market.
To further illustrate the effect of overconfidence on trading volume, we feed a positive return
signal to the IRF functions of markets with significant overconfident effect (i.e., South Korea, Singapore,
Taiwan, and Japan) and simulate the responses of TURN (i.e., trading volume) in the following
three and six months. The positive return shock is calculated by taking the average of all positive
month-to-month changes in RET during the sampling period. This average monthly positive return is
a representative estimation of positive return shocks in each market and captures the notation that the
return from the previous month can be viewed as a reference point that may affect trading strategies in
the following months.
4 The value-weighted price indices are calculated by using Equation (3). The base period (index = 100) is 30 April 2015 for
all markets.
J. Risk Financial Manag. 2020, 13, 232 12 of 21
J. Risk Financial Manag. 2020, 13, x FOR PEER REVIEW  12  of  21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  : Up market  : Down market 
Figure 3. Definition of up‐ and down‐markets. The value‐weighted price indices are calculated by using Equation (2). The base period (index = 100) is 30 April 2015 
for all markets. 
  
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015
Australia
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Hong Kong
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Japan
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Taiwan
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
South Korea
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Singapore
Figure 3. Definition of up- and down-markets. The value-weighted price indices are calculated by using Equation (2). The base period (index = 100) is 30 April 2015
for all markets.
J. Risk Financial Manag. 2020, 13, 232 13 of 21
Table 4. Sub-period VAR results.
Market South Korea Taiwan Singapore Australia Hong Kong Japan
Down Market Period September 2007–October 2008
May 2013–
June 2014
June 2007–
March 2009
June 2007–
March 2009
June 2007–
October 2008
July 2007–
October 2008
Up Market Period November 2008–April 2015
November 2008–
April 2013
April 2009–
April 2015
April 2009–
April 2015
November 2008–
April 2015
November 2008–
April 2015
Dependent Variable TURNt RETt TURNt RETt TURNt RETt TURNt RETt TURNt RETt TURNt RETt
In
de
pe
nd
en
tv
ar
ia
bl
es
TURNt−1 Down Market: −0.171 −0.042 ** 0.182 0.031 ** 0.510 *** 0.171 *** 0.112 –0.038 0.232 0.046 0.147 0.066
Up Market: 0.474 *** 0.001 0.388 *** −0.003 0.308 *** –0.027 0.371 *** –0.013 0.112 0.014 0.406 *** 0.040 *
RETt−1 Down Market: −4.248 −0.115 2.173 −0.580 ** –0.232 0.089 –0.178 –0.330 −0.533 −0.280 −0.977 −0.340
Up Market: 2.217 ** −0.157 4.145 ** 0.034 1.815 *** –0.186 –0.226 –0.180 0.960 −0.186 * 1.427 *** 0.126
VOLt Down Market: 44.731 *** 4.379 *** 138.834 −21.168 *** 0.978 –4.564 *** 0.396 –1.091 9.860 −6.801 *** 2.597 * −3.011 ***
Up Market: 3.465 −1.001 *** 59.016 1.263 –3.923 0.606 4.994 –3.597 ** 43.324 ** −4.609 * 7.303 −1.740
VOLt−1 Down Market: 49.270 *** 0.917 71.519 −17.559 ** –6.303 2.948 * 3.121 –0.955 21.68 0.774 12.600 ** −1.588
Up Market: 4.137 −1.566 *** 3.454 −4.867 *** 23.856 *** 1.110 –1.195 1.100 −0.570 1.578 2.379 −0.183
DISPt Down Market: −2.637 −0.411 7.708 −0.156 1.626 0.639 3.736 * –2.119 4.188 0.435 −6.214 * 2.508 *
Up Market: 5.204 *** 0.799 *** 11.132 * 1.471 *** 1.641 0.896 *** 0.095 0.892 *** −0.390 0.218 5.390 *** 1.281 ***
DISPt−1 Down Market: −1.013 0.168 −3.253 0.099 2.061 –0.746 –2.749 1.416 −8.841 * −1.103 −2.110 0.981
Up Market: −2.275 −0.243 −7.144 −0.154 –2.475 * 0.460 * 0.102 0.109 0.278 0.066 −6.285 *** −0.132
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01. The down- and the up-market periods are different for the six markets. For South Korea, the down-market and the up-market is from
September 2007 to October 2008, and from November 2008 to April 2015, respectively. For Taiwan, the down-market and the up-market is from May 2013 to June 2014 and from November
2008 to April 2013, respectively. For Singapore, the down-market and the up-market are from June 2007 to March 2009 and from April 2009 to April 2015, respectively. For Australia,
the down-market and the up-market are from June 2007 to March 2009 and from April 2009 to April 2015, respectively. For Hong Kong, the down-market and the up-market are from June
2007 to October 2008 and from November 2008 to April 2015, respectively. For Japan, the down-market and the up-market are from July 2007 to October 2008 and from November 2008 to
April 2015, respectively.
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Table 5 shows that the South Korea REIT market has the largest average positive return increase
(10.62%), followed by the REIT markets of Japan (5.96%), Singapore (5.14%), and Taiwan (3.08%).
The initial response to this positive return shock is rather large in certain markets. For instance,
the overall trading volume is estimated to increase by 41.53% and 14.92% in the subsequent three
months in the South Korea and Taiwan REIT markets, respectively. Meanwhile, the response in the
Singapore and Japan REIT markets is mild. When the investigation window is extended to six months,
the response of the trading volume increases only marginally across all four markets. This finding is
consistent with the patterns identified in Figure 2, where overconfident trading mainly occurs within
the first three months following the return shocks.
Table 5. Trading volume responses to positive return shocks.
Markets South Korea Taiwan Singapore Japan
Average positive returns 10.62% 3.08% 5.14% 5.96%
Trading volume changes—3 months 41.53% 14.92% 2.64% 5.12%
Trading volume changes—6 months 42.15% 17.14% 2.88% 6.61%
5. Robustness Check
In Section 4, the variable DISP is the cross-sectional value-weighted standard deviation of REIT
returns following Statman et al. (2006). An alternative measurement is the mean absolute cross-sectional
return deviation (MAD) as in Bessembinder et al. (1996) and Chuang and Lee (2006).
MADt =
n∑
i=1
|rit −RETt| PitSit∑n
j=1 P jtS jt
(9)
The variable VOL uses the raw daily return of each month only (French et al. 1987). We also
considered squared residuals, generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH)
filters, and asymmetric GARCH filters as alternative measurements of VOL. Specifically, the daily
value-weighted return of each REIT market is used to fit an autoregressive (AR) model, and then
squared daily residuals are cumulated into monthly volatility, as suggested by Griffin et al. (2007).
The monthly volatility generated with this approach is named ARVOL. To generate the GARCH
estimator of volatility (GARCHVOL hereafter), we used a GARCH (1,1) model as specified in Equations
(10) and (11) below.
rt = φ(L)rt + εt, εt ∼ N
(
0, σt2
)
(10)
σt
2 = α0 + α1εt−12 + β1σt−12 (11)
where rt is the daily value-weighted market return and φ(L) is the lag operator.
In a stock market, a negative return evidently influences volatility more than a positive return
with the same magnitude. The TGARCH model is designed to capture this asymmetric effect
(Glosten et al. 1993). Specifically, this model modifies the GARCH model by adding a TARCH term to
the conditional variance, and extending Equations (11) and (12) as follows:
σt
2 = α0 + α1εt−12 + γ1It−1εt−12 + β1σt−12 (12)
where It−1 is the indicator function that is equal to 1 if εt−1 < 0, and 0 otherwise.
Although the TGARCH model is an extension of the GARCH model, a REIT market may not have
the asymmetric effect. Therefore, the TGARCH model is only used when the estimated coefficient of γ1
is significant in Equation (12), e.g., for South Korea, Singapore, Australia, and Japan REIT markets only.
The newly generated variable under TGARCH, if used in the estimation, is then named TGARCHVOL.
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Three pairs of alternative control variables (ARVOL-MAD, GARCHVOL-MAD, and TGARCHVOL-
MAD) are generated to re-estimate the VAR model in Section 4 (i.e., the baseline model as illustrated in
Table 2). Table 6 contrasts the coefficient estimates of RET, VOL, and DISP between the three alternative
approaches and the baseline model in Panels A, B, and C, respectively. Panel D of Table 6 shows the
model summary (e.g., AR lag and GARCH terms significant at the 1% level).
Panel A shows that the overconfidence effects of the six REIT markets are insensitive to the
choice of volatility and dispersion measures. The overconfident trading behavior is still significant in
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan but insignificant in Hong Kong and Australia. For each
of the four markets with the overconfidence effect, the magnitude of the lagged return coefficients is
similar between the baseline and the alternative models. The three alternative models offer consistent
support to Hypotheses 1 and 2.
Further evidence of the robustness of our results can be found in Panels B and C, where the
coefficient estimates of VOL and DISP are highly consistent between the baseline and the alternative
models. The magnitude of the coefficient estimates of VOL significantly differs among the models,
which is an expected result of the different volatility measures.
In addition to the full-sample VAR estimation, we also conduct IRF analysis using alternative
measures. To save space, we only summarize the value of IRF over different periods in Table 7.
Consistent with the results in Figure 2, the confidence bands in the Australia and Hong Kong REIT
markets do not suggest an IRF that is significantly different from zero. Therefore, we report the
four markets with a significant turnover response to market return shocks only. Specifically, Table 7
indicates the IRF in South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and Singapore only. Overall, the turnover response
to return patterns is similar among the three IRF versions in all four REIT markets and, importantly,
consistent with the patterns identified in Figure 2.
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Table 6. VAR full-sample results in different measures of market volatility and dispersion.
South Korea Taiwan Singapore Australia Hong Kong Japan
Panel A: Lagged RET Coefficient on TURN
First lag First lag First lag First lag First lag First lag Second lag
ARVOL-MAD 0.988 ** 3.279 ** 0.866 * −0.358 0.023 0.826 ** 0.604 **
GARCHVOL-MAD 0.988 ** 3.279 ** 0.866 * −0.358 0.023 0.826 ** 0.604 **
TGARCHVOL-MAD 0.920 ** NA 0.924 * −0.365 NA 0.827 ** 0.593 **
Baseline model 1.265 *** 3.762 ** 1.138 ** −0.232 0.089 0.883 ** 0.556 *
Panel B: concurrent VOL on TURN
ARVOL-MAD 38.678 *** 100.508 * 10.484 6.863 35.283 *** 9.885 ***
GARCHVOL-MAD 38.678 *** 100.508 * 10.484 6.863 35.283 *** 9.885 ***
TGARCHVOL-MAD 43.805 *** NA 14.352 5.944 NA 9.191 ***
Baseline model 8.766 *** 24.391 * 5.774 1.419 16.542 *** 3.251 **
Panel C: concurrent DISP on TURN
ARVOL-MAD 4.914 *** 13.869 *** 1.897 −0.165 1.761 5.434 ***
GARCHVOL-MAD 4.914 *** 13.869 *** 1.897 −0.165 1.761 5.434 ***
TGARCHVOL-MAD 4.788 *** NA 1.837 −0.100 NA 5.442 ***
Baseline model 4.870 *** 10.798 ** 1.152 −0.083 1.764 4.117 ***
Panel D: model summary
AR lag 11 3 7 8 9 13
ARCH terms significant YES YES YES YES YES YES
GARCH terms significant YES YES YES YES YES YES
TARCH terms significant YES NO YES YES NO YES
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01. Panel A presents the estimation results of the lagged market return coefficient in the TURN equation. Panel B presents the estimation results of
the concurrent market volatility coefficient in the TURN equation. Panel C presents the estimation results of the concurrent market dispersion coefficient in the TURN equation. Each of the
three panels reports three results with alternative control variable measures along with the base model results for comparison. YES/NO denotes whether the corresponding term is
significant at the 1% level.
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Table 7. Robustness check of the impulse response function analysis.
Month 1 Month 2 Month 3 Month 4 Month 5 Month 6 3 Months 6 Months
South Korea ARVOL-MAD 24.50% 20.20% 7.30% 2.50% 0.90% 0.30% 52.00% 55.70%
TGARCHVOL-MAD 22.30% 18.50% 6.60% 2.40% 0.90% 0.30% 47.40% 50.90%
Base model 27.80% 21.20% 5.20% 0.70% 0.00% 0.00% 54.10% 54.90%
Taiwan ARVOL-MAD 5.30% 11.30% 5.70% 2.20% 0.70% 0.20% 22.30% 25.50%
TGARCHVOL-MAD 5.30% 11.30% 5.80% 2.20% 0.80% 0.20% 22.40% 25.60%
Base model 5.00% 12.30% 6.20% 2.40% 0.80% 0.30% 23.50% 27.00%
Japan ARVOL-MAD 5.80% 6.00% 5.90% 2.30% 1.30% 0.70% 17.70% 22.00%
TGARCHVOL-MAD 5.80% 6.00% 5.80% 2.20% 1.30% 0.70% 17.60% 21.80%
Base model 4.40% 6.00% 5.80% 2.60% 1.50% 0.70% 16.10% 20.90%
Singapore ARVOL-MAD 0.80% 4.90% 1.60% 0.40% 0.10% 0.00% 7.30% 7.80%
TGARCHVOL-MAD 1.20% 5.30% 1.50% 0.30% 0.10% 0.00% 8.00% 8.30%
Base model 0.90% 5.90% 2.10% 0.60% 0.20% 0.00% 9.00% 9.70%
Notes: This table reports the IRF in each of the six months following one-standard deviation market return shock and the accumulated IRF over three- and six-month periods.
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Finally, we also assess the sensitivity of the sub-period results to alternative pairs of control
variables. Table 8 compares the coefficient estimates of RETt−1 in the baseline model and alternative
models. Evidently, different control variable measures do not change the conclusion regarding
Hypothesis 3. Overall, the findings in Section 4 are robust and reliable.
Table 8. Robustness check of sub-period VAR results.
South Korea Taiwan Singapore Australia Hong Kong Japan
AR-MAD
Down 2.384 2.687 −0.060 −0.344 −0.625 −0.903
Up 3.358 *** 3.148 0.951 * −0.148 0.323 1.388 ***
GARCH-MAD
Down 2.384 2.687 −0.060 −0.344 −0.625 −0.903
Up 3.358 *** 3.148 0.951 * −0.148 0.323 1.388 ***
TGARCH-MAD
Down 2.515 2.685 −0.059 −0.332 −0.634 −0.882
Up 3.433 *** 3.148 0.976 * −0.116 0.287 1.367 ***
Base model
Down −4.248 2.173 −0.232 −0.178 −0.533 −0.977
Up 2.217 ** 4.145 ** 1.815 *** −0.226 0.960 1.427 ***
Notes: This table shows the coefficient of RETt−1 in the baseline model. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01.
The down- and the up-market periods are different for the six markets. For South Korea, the down-market and
the up-market are from September 2007 to October 2008 and from November 2008 to April 2015, respectively.
For Taiwan, the down-market and the up-market are from May 2013 to June 2014 and from November 2008 to April
2013, respectively. For Singapore, the down-market and the up-market are from June 2007 to March 2009 and from
April 2009 to April 2015, respectively. For Australia, the down-market and the up-market are from June 2007 to
March 2009 and from April 2009 to April 2015, respectively. For Hong Kong, the down-market and the up-market
are from June 2007 to October 2008 and from November 2008 to April 2015, respectively. For Japan, the down-market
and the up-market are from July 2007 to October 2008 and from November 2008 to April 2015, respectively.
6. Conclusions
Overconfidence manifests when investors attribute too much investment success to their
investment ability, which subsequently causes investors to trade actively in the future. Empirical
analysis often identifies the aggregate overconfidence effect through a positive lead-lag relationship
between trading activity and previous market performance. In this study, we verify this relationship by
using data from six Asia Pacific REIT markets. Our VAR estimation demonstrates that overconfidence
causes excessive trading activities. In addition, the overconfidence effect is larger in inefficient market
settings and is only present in up-markets. All results are robust to alternative measurements of the
control variables.
Excessive trading caused by overconfidence negatively affects investment performance.
Unfortunately, real estate markets are known to be a hot bed for behavioral anomalies and biases
(see, e.g., Bao and Gong 2017; Bokhari and Geltner 2011; Liu et al. 2015), and overconfidence is no
exception (Eichholtz and Yönder 2015; Tan 2017; Yung et al. 2015). Our study makes the first attempt
to empirically verify the overconfidence effect in the REIT sector. The findings add value to the
general overconfidence literature and provide valuable insights into the overconfidence effect in the
REIT markets, where behavioral biases could be more prevalent. Our findings also have significant
policy implications. Specifically, we found that market inefficiency amplifies the overconfidence effect,
which is costly to both investors and the society. Such a finding is further evidence that market
friction negatively affects investment performance by aggravating the overconfidence effect. Moreover,
the overconfidence effect is only significant during up-markets. Policymakers and regulators should
be cautious about the effects of overconfidence on market momentum during a market boom.
Our findings are consistent with the existing overconfidence literature and provide new information
about the overconfidence effect in the Asia Pacific REIT markets. Nevertheless, the analysis is conducted
on the aggregated, market level only. One way to extend this study is to evaluate the positive lead-lag
J. Risk Financial Manag. 2020, 13, 232 19 of 21
relationship between trading activity and previous market performance on an individual level.
For instance, one may obtain the profile and trading records of individual investors and then analyze
whether and how investment gains affect trading activities in the future. Such an analysis could verify
the overconfidence effect on a disaggregated level and reveal whether the investor’s characteristics
(i.e., demographic, social, or economic traits) moderate the overconfidence effect. Certainly, this type of
analysis should use data from a small geographical region to reduce the effect of confounding factors,
instead of adopting the multiple countries approach as in this study.
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